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O ver the past 25 years, several new “medicines” have come screech-ing onto health care’s various 
platforms, including narrative medicine, 
personalized medicine, precision medicine 
and person-centred medicine. Philosopher 
Miriam Solomon calls the first three of 
these movements different “ways of know-
ing” or “methods,” and argues that they are 
each a response to shortcomings of meth-
ods that came before them.1 They should 
also be understood as reactions to the cur-
rent dominant model of medicine. In this 
article, I will describe our dominant model, 
which I call “the new medical model.”2 I will 
argue that several towering problems in 
modern medicine can be traced to its philo-
sophical foundations, which calls for philo-
sophical analysis.
Forty years ago in his article “The Need 
for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for 
Biomedicine,”3 psychiatrist Dr. George 
Engel wrote: “The dominant model of dis-
ease today is biomedical.” Engel argued 
that the “biomedical model” or “biomedi-
cine” was the traditional model of disease 
as well as the orthodox model of medical 
practice. This model conceptualized dis-
ease as deviation from normal biological 
functioning owing to biological determi-
nants, described in the language of the 
basic biomedical sciences, including anat-
omy, physiology and molecular biology.
The biomedical model directed the phy-
sician to correct disease and restore normal 
functioning. How so? By using knowledge 
from these very sciences. Because of the 
perceived “reductionism” and neglect of the 
psychological and the social among the 
components of the model, the biomedical 
model has since been a target of incisive crit-
icisms, many of which have been advanced 
by scholars in the humanities and social sci-
ences, including philosophers.4
Although biomedicine is sometimes 
called “the medical model,” I will refer to it 
as the “old medical model” for reasons I 
will explain shortly. We can identify at least 
three essential components of the old 
medical model as described by Engel: a 
disease concept, an ethic and a logic. Its 
disease concept is disease-as-bodily-bio-
logical-dysfunction. Its ethic or ethical 
imperative is to cure the disease, fix the 
dysfunction. Finally, its logic or “style of 
scientific reasoning”5 consists of biomedi-
cal “mechanistic reasoning,” reasoning 
through biomedical mechanisms of health 
and disease. In summary, the kind of medi-
cine modelled by the old medical model is 
one in which physicians cure biological dis-
ease using biomedical mechanistic reason-
ing. The paradigmatic diseases for the old 
model are acute infectious diseases, which 
are generally curable, and can be under-
stood and treated using biologic rationale: 
for a bacterial infection, treat with an anti-
biotic to halt the germ’s growth or survival, 
and thus clear the infection.
By the time Engel wrote his “challenge to 
biomedicine,” health care was already being 
transformed by two major developments: 
the rise of chronic diseases and evidence-
based medicine. Chronic diseases defy the 
old medical model because they are gener-
ally incurable, and many patients with 
chronic disease have not one disease but 
multiple distinct diseases (multimorbidity). 
Meanwhile, evidence-based medicine defies 
the old model by privileging reasoning from 
the results of clinical epidemiologic studies 
rather than mechanistic reasoning.
In response to these new clinical reali-
ties, the old medical model has evolved 
into the “new medical model,” which rep-
resents the cure, prevention and manage-
ment of biological disease(s) using the rea-
soning and principles of evidence-based 
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medicine.2 The new medical model’s dis-
ease concept may be unchanged com-
pared with the old model (the “concept of 
disease” debate in the philosophy of medi-
cine is lively and ongoing6). However, the 
new model’s ethic is expanded to accom-
modate the prevention and management 
of incurable chronic disease and multimor-
bidity, and its logic is the logic of evidence-
based medicine. 
The new medical model is enshrined in 
clinical guideline–directed care because 
guidelines are typically disease-specific and 
evidence-based. For instance, the guideline-
driven care of a patient with type 2 diabetes 
and heart failure would have the physician 
manage these biological disturbances (in 
glucose homeostasis, in cardiac function) 
individually while preventing other diseases 
or complications through interventions sup-
ported by evidence from clinical research, 
especially clinical trials.
The new medical model was not quite 
what Engel had in mind when he announced 
the need for a new model in the title of his 
seminal essay.3 The new medical model 
blends the old with the new, inheriting many 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
old model, while creating new problems for 
medicine. These problems include reduc-
tionistic and fractured care, as well as the 
challenges of generalizing and applying 
study results. These practical problems are 
entangled with philosophical problems, 
problems concerning the metaphysics or 
nature of chronic disease and multimorbid-
ity, the ethical ends of medicine and the epis-
temology or logic of evidence-based medi-
cine. Philosophers can be of service here by 
disentangling the philosophical from the 
practical problems and contributing toward 
unraveling both.
In the philosophy of medicine, reduc-
tionism can be understood as a strategy in 
which clinical symptoms or outcomes are 
explained with respect to parts of the 
patient (organs, cells, molecules).7 Simi-
larly, in medicine, patient care is often 
described as reductionistic when it is ori-
ented toward or organized around body 
parts instead of treating the whole patient 
in their life context. Together, the new 
medical model’s disease concept and its 
disease-centred ethic promote reduction-
ism, because diseases are understood with 
reference to the body’s component parts, 
and the goal is to cure, prevent or manage 
the disease. When patients have multimor-
bidity, care can further become fractured 
or fragmented under the new model  — 
with increased risk of treatment conflicts — 
because multimorbidity is managed by 
treating each of its constituent diseases.
Philosophers of medicine can lend 
insight into these problems by investigat-
ing our concept of disease,6 the nature of 
chronic disease and comorbidity/multi-
morbidity,8 and explanatory strategies in 
medicine.7 For example, given the impor-
tance of psychological and social factors in 
the prevention and management of chronic 
maladies, it is worthwhile exploring 
whether chronic diseases and their patho-
genesis are best understood  — and even 
best defined — at psychological and social 
levels in addition to biological levels. How-
ever, how can we define multilevel chronic 
diseases and pathogenesis in a substantive 
way that facilitates effective prevention 
and management and goes beyond simply 
listing social determinants?2 Likewise, 
because fractured care is so problematic, it 
is worth exploring whether comorbidities 
are truly distinct/discrete entities,2,8 and 
how we might better represent and classify 
complex morbidity in a more integrative 
way for patients who currently receive mul-
tiple chronic disease diagnoses.
Meanwhile, the challenges of generaliz-
ing and applying study results arise because 
of the evidence-based logic of the new 
medical model, in which physicians make 
diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic pre-
dictions based on clinical epidemiologic 
evidence. Generalizing study results and 
applying them to particular patients are 
inferences and, like all scientific inferences, 
they rely upon assumptions.9 Unfortunately, 
the inferences and their assumptions are 
poorly articulated in medicine and rarely 
acknowledged. Medical commentators 
often worry that explanatory randomized 
trials have poor generalizability and average 
study results apply poorly to particular 
patients, if at all. Philosophers of science 
investigate such concerns by rationally 
reconstructing the underlying inferences, 
exposing and examining their assumptions, 
and by developing alternate methods for 
sound prediction.9,10
The practical challenges I described 
(reductionistic/fractured care, generalizing/
applying study results) are not inevitable 
challenges for medicine, because they arise 
owing to the concepts, ethics and logic of a 
particular model of practice (the new medi-
cal model). Various recent movements in 
medicine seek to remedy the model’s short-
comings. Narrative medicine and person-
centred medicine reject the model’s disease-
centred ethic. Personalized medicine and 
precision medicine focus on its logic and 
aim to improve individualized prediction. 
Engel’s own strategy was to reject the medi-
cal model’s disease concept and propose a 
biopsychosocial model3 in which disease is 
conceptualized in terms of the psychological 
and social in addition to the biological.
In summary, the new medical model rep-
resents the evolution of biomedicine in 
response to the rise of chronic diseases and 
evidence-based medicine, and it embodies a 
philosophy of care on a grand scale. Rising 
to the new challenges that it poses will 
require both medical and philosophical 
wisdom.2
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